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Abstract
This paper analyses in a VAR framework with debt feedback effects of fiscal policy over 1999q1 to
2013q4 in six Central and East European economies: Slovakia, Czech republic, Hungary, Poland,
Slovenia and Lithuania. The way the debt feedback is accounted for as well as the nonlinearities
operating behind the government budget constraint matter for the understanding of the effects of
fiscal policy shocks. The debt feedback dampens the effects on output and eliminates persistence
in the responses over longer horizons. Simulations starting from various levels of the debt ratio
suggest that high government indebtedness might imply a sacrifice in the policy effectiveness on
output over the medium term. Simulated out-of-sample debt paths are stabilised if debt feedback
is included, but strongly explosive otherwise.
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Non-technical summary
This paper upgrades the literature on new EU countries by examining the impact of government in-
debtedness on the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Analysing effects of fiscal shocks in these countries
from different viewpoints remains rather appealing. Government budget, unlike e.g. the interest
rate or the exchange rate, is a policy making tool over which the small members have retained con-
trol. Despite intensifying debates about further integration, the member countries would rather
unlikely give up on their fiscal autonomy.
Among the challenges in the field of fiscal policy research, debt deserves closer attention. The
debt ratios in the new EU members have substantially increased since the Great Recession. Levels of
debt may have important implications for fiscal policy effects on the economy. Large panel studies
find that high debt would limit the effectiveness of fiscal policy (e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko,
2013; or Nickel and Tudyka, 2014).
The obvious question that arises is what impact does debt exert to the effectiveness of fiscal
policy in the new EU members. Interactions of government debt, fiscal policy and the economy
have not deserved voluminous attention in the literature on new EU economies. With the aim to
improve our knowledge on the role of debt, this paper analyses fiscal policy effects under explicit
debt feedback over 1991q1 to 2013q4 in six Central and East European countries (CEE-6): Slo-
vakia, Czech republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Lithuania. It makes use of the framework
provided by Favero and Giavazzi (2007). The framework extends the traditional VAR setup of
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) for a nonlinear equation, the government budget constraint.
Applying this framework in the CEE countries encounters difficulties given the counterintuitive
relationship between the variables and the debt ratio. In particular, the bond yields have been
steadily declining over the estimation horizon against increasing levels of public indebtedness.
Moreover, stabilisation attempts after the onset of the crisis implied that fiscal variables were not
responding to the rising debt ratios. Based on a detailed correlation analysis as well as consider-
ations w.r.t. overall stability of the system of equations, plausibility of the impulse responses and
of the forecasted debt trajectories, two empirical specifications of the variables are used, both in
levels and transformed. In the latter case, the results are estimated over the pre-crisis sample.
Unlike in linear VAR models, the response functions depend on the size and sign of the shocks
and on the initial conditions, pointing to nonlinearities involved with the government debt dynam-
ics. Both inclusion of the debt feedback and the way it is implemented have a qualitative impact on
the behaviour of other variables. The debt feedback dampens the effects on output and eliminates
persistence in the responses over longer horizons, especially following expenditure shocks. Sim-
ulations starting from various levels of the debt ratio suggest that high government indebtedness
might imply a sacrifice in the policy effectiveness on output over the medium term. Simulated out-
of-sample debt paths are stabilised under debt feedback, but strongly explosive if debt feedback is
omitted.
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1 Motivation
This paper upgrades the literature on new EU countries by examining the impact of government in-
debtedness on the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Analysing effects of fiscal shocks in these countries
from different viewpoints remains rather appealing. Government budget, unlike e.g. the interest
rate or the exchange rate, is a policy making tool over which the small members have retained con-
trol. Despite intensifying debates about further integration, the member countries would rather
unlikely give up on their fiscal autonomy. Among the challenges in the field of fiscal policy re-
search, debt deserves closer attention. The debt ratios in the new EU members have substantially
increased since the Great Recession, to about 40-80 percent GDP. The crisis thus discontinued the
long period over which the public debt ratios in the new EU countries were associated with levels
of about 20-30 percent GDP. There were exceptions, such as e.g. Hungary and Poland, but as until
the crisis, their relatively high debt ratios followed a declining trend.
Levels of debt may have important implications for the fiscal policy effects on the economy.
Large panel studies find that high debt would limit the effectiveness of fiscal policy (e.g. Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko, 2013; or Nickel and Tudyka, 2014). A related, puzzling problem is whether
high debt itself poses a challenge for economic growth. Some authors, as e.g. Panizza and Pres-
bitero (2014), deny a negative causal effect between debt and growth. Some other authors find
that there are thresholds in the relationship of public debt and GDP, above which debt may have
negative impact on subsequent growth. An example for the OECD countries is due to Elmeskov
and Sutherland (2012), who identified such thresholds in the debt ratio at around 45 and 66 per-
cent GDP. Notwithstanding the general disagreement on this issue, such debt ratios match those
observed recently in the enlarged part of the EU.
The obvious question that arises is what impact does debt exert to the effectiveness of fiscal
policy in the new EU members. The impact will translate into estimates of impulse response
functions and joint forecasts of the macroeconomic and fiscal variables.
A convenient framework to address this issue is provided by Favero and Giavazzi (2007), hence-
forth FG. The authors extended the traditional VAR setup of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) for a
nonlinear equation, the government budget constraint. Keeping track of its implications for the
policy analysis is not a new problem, see e.g. Bohn (1998) and Sims (1998) and references herein.
Recent applications of the FG model include e.g. Afonso and Souza (2012) for the U.S., the U.K.,
Germany and Italy, and Parkyn and Vehbi (2014) for the New Zealand.
Interactions of government debt, fiscal policy and the economy have not deserved voluminous
attention in the literature on new EU economies. Ilzetzki (2011) estimates, using the FG frame-
work, fiscal policy effects under debt feedback for Estonia and four developing countries. Inclusion
of the debt feedback for Estonia amplified and eventually changed the sign of the response of GDP
and inflation to fiscal shocks. Melecky and Melecky (2011) and Eller and Urvova (2012) analyse
macroeconomic determinants of the government debt paths. However, rather than characterising
fiscal policy effects, they only discuss the responses of the debt ratio to shocks in other variables.
For some of the countries, effects of fiscal shocks were estimated by means of theoretical New-
Keynesian models. Examples include Stork and Zavacka (2010), Klyuev and Snudden (2011) and
Ambrisko et al. (2012) for the Czech republic, Algozhina (2012) and Benk and Jakab (2012) for
Hungary, Clancy et al. (2014) for Slovenia, and Mucka and Horvath (2015) for Slovakia. Such
models are very data intensive, which makes estimation and comparison for a larger number of
economies inconvenient. Rather than discussing the impact of debt, the main focus of the studies
was to simulate propagation of fiscal shocks under a detailed break-down of the fiscal instruments.
Empirical papers that investigate fiscal policy effects in new EU members mostly use the tradi-
tional VAR model following Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Details are listed in Table 1. With the
exception of the model of Haug et al. (2013), government debt is not included in the specification.
With the aim to improve our knowledge on the role of debt, this paper analyses fiscal policy
effects under explicit debt feedback over 1991q1 to 2013q4 in six Central and East European coun-
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Table 1: Empirical papers on fiscal policy effects in the CEE-6
Authors Coverage Sample
range
Macroeconomic variables Fiscal variables
(government)
Baxa (2010) Czech r. 1998q1-
2009q2
GDP, GDP deflator, 3-m
interest rate
revenue, expenditure
Franta (2012) Czech r. 1999q1-
2011q3
GDP, inflation, interest rate net taxes, spending
Lendvai (2007) Hungary 1997q1-
2005q4
GDP, private consumption,
investment, employment,
GDP deflator, REER
net taxes, expenditure,
consumption, investment,
public wages
Kotosz and Peak
(2013)
Hungary 1960-2011 GDP expenditure
Klyviene and
Karmelavicius
(2012)
Lithuania 1997q1-
2011q1
GDP, employment, FDI corporate income tax
revenue, revenue from
other taxes, domestic and
comparative effective
corporate tax rate,
spending
Haug et al. (2013) Poland 1998q1-
2012q4
GDP, CPI inflation, REER,
interest rate, monetary
aggregates, foreign GDP,
foreign interest rate
revenue, spending, public
debt
Jemec et al. (2011) Slovenia 1995q1-
2010q4
GDP net taxes, spending
Pecsyova (2013) Slovakia 1997q1-
2012q1
GDP, inflation, interest rate net taxes, spending
Mirdala (2009) Czech r., Hungary,
Poland, Slovakia,
Bulgaria, Romania
2000q1-
2008q4
GDP, inflation, short-term
interest rate
revenue, expenditure
Eller et al. (2011) Czech r., Hungary,
Poland, Slovenia,
Slovakia
1995q1-
2009q4
GDP, short-term interest
rate, NEER,inflation
net taxes, spending, foreign
fiscal balance
Karmelavicius and
Klyviene (2012)
Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania
1997q1-
2011q4
(Lithuania)
GDP, employment, FDI corporate income tax
revenue, revenue from
other taxes, spending
Mirdala (2013) Bulgaria, Czech
r., Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia
2000q1-
2012q3
GDP, inflation, short-term
interest rate
revenue, expenditure
Bencik (2014) Visegrad countries 1997q4-
2012q4
net exports, RER spending
Dinu and Marinas
(2014)
Czech r., Hungary,
Poland, Slovenia,
Slovakia, Bulgaria,
Romania
1999q1-
2012q2
GDP, inflation, interest rate net taxes, spending
Note: Most of the papers follow in model specification and identification the structural approach of Blanchard
and Perotti (2002). In addition, Mirdala (2009; 2013) and Klyviene and Karmelavicius (2012) also use a
recursive Choleski scheme. Haug et al. (2013) use an adapted AB identification approach. Franta (2012) esti-
mates the VAR reduced form by a hierarchical Bayesian approach and identifies the model using three various
schemes: a structural approach, a recursive scheme and sign restrictions. Bencik (2014) uses a smoothed tran-
sition autoregressive model (STVAR) to compute dual regime fiscal multipliers for recessions and expansions.
4
tries (CEE-6): Slovakia, Czech republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Lithuania. The model in
Section 2 is an application of the FG framework. In order to track the impact of debt feedback,
two alternative specifications are considered, the FG model without debt feedback, and a model
with debt within the linear VAR. Coming up with meaningfully signed impulse responses proved
cumbersome, given the counterintuitive relationships among the key variables and the debt ratio.
Based on a detailed correlation analysis, the paper adopts two sorts of variables’ specifications in
the headline FG model, both in levels and transformed. Section 4 presents a rich set of empirical
results, that have not been brought up before for the CEE countries, such as response functions
generated at various levels of the debt ratio and historical decomposition of the time series under
debt feedback. Unlike in linear VAR models, the response functions depend on the size and sign of
the shocks and on the initial conditions, pointing to nonlinearities involved with the government
debt dynamics. Both inclusion of the debt feedback and the way it is implemented have a qual-
itative impact on the behaviour of other variables. The debt feedback would dampen the effects
on output and eliminate persistence in the responses over longer horizons, especially following
expenditure shocks. Simulated out-of-sample debt paths are stabilised under debt feedback, but
strongly explosive if debt feedback is omitted. The final section draws concluding remarks and
suggests areas for further research.
2 Methodology
This section sets forth a fiscal VAR model with debt feedback in the vein of Favero and Giavazzi
(2007). As a distinctive feature, this approach incorporates the government budget constraint, an
identity that links dynamically and nonlinearly all variables included in the VAR model.
Omission of this constraint would have important consequences (cf. Favero and Giavazzi, 2007;
Afonso and Souza, 2012; Cherif and Hasanov, 2012; Parkyn and Vehbi, 2014). It would assume
zero effects of debt levels on output and inflation. It might bias the estimates of the VAR coeffi-
cients. Price level and long-term interest rates might not plausibly respond to fiscal shocks. Also,
it would rule out the possibility that government revenue and expenditure will react to debt levels
whenever fiscal authorities care about the sustainability of public finances. In turn, debt ratios
simulated from a VAR without debt feedback might turn explosive.
2.1 Fiscal VAR model with debt feedback
The model employed is a system of equations which consists of a fiscal SVARX model with govern-
ment debt ratio as an exogenous variable, and of the government budget constraint.
The linear SVARX(k,l) model is specified in the reduced form as:
Xt = A0 + k∑
i=1Ai ⋅ Xt−i + l∑j=1Γj ⋅ byt−j +Ut (1)
where Xt is a vector in inflation in the implicit GDP deflator (pit), interest rate (rt), real GDP (yt),
real government revenue (tt), real government primary expenditure (xt), and money growth (mt);
Ai denotes coefficient matrix at the i-th lag of the endogenous variables and Γj is coefficient vector
at the j-th lag of the debt ratio byt; Ut is a vector of reduced-form residuals.
The motion of government debt follows the nonlinear equation:
bt = 1 + rt
1 + pit ⋅ bt−1 + xt − tt (2)
where bt is real government debt. The debt ratio is defined as byt ≡ bt/(4 ⋅ yt). The government
budget constraint is included in the system as an identity. The idea is to endogenise feedback from
5
the debt dynamics in the linear SVARX. As a result, the debt ratio becomes an endogenous variable
within the system.
Reduced-form residuals are linked to the underlying structural shocks Wt as P−1 ⋅Ut = Wt, where
P is an identification matrix.
2.2 Estimation and identification
In a first step, (1) is estimated as a usual reduced form vector autoregression. The model is then
identified using a triangular decomposition such that P is the lower Choleski factor of the residuals’
covariance matrix. Given the small sample context, estimator for the covariance matrix was scaled
down using the number of parameters.
Variables in the identification matrix are ordered as listed in Xt such that:q inflation, interest rate and real GDP are predetermined w.r.t. fiscal policy shocks,q government revenue is predetermined w.r.t. government expenditure,q money growth responds contemporaneously to fiscal shocks (cf. Afonso and Souza, 2012).
2.3 Simulation
Simulation of the above system for a desired number of periods involves defining shocks Et and
initial conditions in Xt and bt, and iterating the following steps:
1. Using estimated VAR coefficients and identification matrix, solve forward
Xt = A0 + k∑
i=1Ai ⋅ Xt−i + l∑j=1Γj ⋅ byt−j + P ⋅ Et (3)
2. Compute government debt ratio using the simulated VAR variables.
Various simulation results are obtained as follows:q In the baseline simulation, shocks are set zero.q Structural impulse response functions are constructed as the difference between a shock sce-
nario, where arbitrarily specified shocks occur at t = 0, and a baseline scenario.q Confidence intervals under debt feedback are constructed as the 10-th and 90-th percentile of
the impulse response distributions obtained by one-step bootstrapping in 1000 draws.q Forecast error variance decomposition under debt feedback is obtained from the estimated im-
pulse response coefficients and the covariance matrix of the reduced form residuals using the
standard formulae.q Historical decomposition of the variables is obtained as the difference between a shock scenario
using as Et the estimated structural shocks, and a baseline scenario.
2.4 Properties of the impulse response functions
Response functions to fiscal shocks, and especially those of the GDP, are often referred to as so-
called fiscal multipliers. That concept encourages a simple way to think about effects of policies.
We would think of "constants" that will give us the resulting dollar added GDP if we multiply the
additional dollar invested. In the context of linear VAR models, the multipliers are obtained from
the estimated VAR coefficients by simple recursive multiplication. In this model, however, feedback
from an external nonlinear equation feeds in the linear VAR part. The response coefficients cannot
be obtained analytically. They are constructed as a difference between the shock and no shock
scenario, both of which are simulated in levels, starting from non-zero initial conditions. Even if
all else is equal, the response functions will depend on the sign and size of the shock (does the
fiscal instrument increase or decrease when the shock occurs and by how much?), and on the
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initial conditions (how large is e.g. the starting debt ratio?). To borrow a wording from Muir et
al. (2010), p. 8, "there is no such thing as a simple fiscal multiplier." Instead of point-wise constants,
we should want to think of response functions as of dynamic behaviours that will follow given the
set of critical conditions.
Figure 1 visualises some of the response functions properties. Unlike in linear VAR models,
responses obtained in a VAR model with debt feedback will feature asymmetry and nonlinearity,
and they will depend on the initial conditions. Figure 1a illustrates that a negative fiscal shock of
the same size will not yield an identical behaviour, just with an opposite sign. Figure 1b shows
that an n-times larger impulse will not yield an n-times larger response. The differences will grow
with the size of the impulse and with the length of the simulation horizon. Albeit being small, the
differences between the responses illustrate more profound nonlinearities behind the government
budget constraint, that will operate at higher levels of debt or in times of larger imbalances.
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Figure 1: Properties of the response functions
Note: Shown are responses of the GDP to a government expenditure shock: (a) Lithuania, shocks of the size
40 and -40 percent GDP, (b) Czech republic, shocks of the size 1, 2, ..., to 5 percent GDP.
2.5 Alternative specifications
So far, the text discussed the model with debt feedback following FG (headline model). In order
to show the impact of debt feedback on the results, two alternative specifications are considered:q First, a model labeled in further text as "without debt feedback". This specification is similar
to traditional fiscal models that have been used in the previous CEE-related literature. It is
estimated as (1) with the debt ratio as an exogenous variable, but in simulations the lags of
the debt ratio are omitted. It was used for demonstration purposes e.g. by Favero and Giavazzi
(2007) and Afonso and Souza (2012).q Second, a model labeled in further text as "debt in VAR". In this case, the debt ratio is included
within the linear VAR as a seventh variable. This specification ignores the nonlinearity in the
debt equation. It makes a possibly strong assumption that impulse responses do not depend on
initial conditions. It was used for demonstration purposes e.g. by Cherif and Hasanov (2012).
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3 Data and estimation issues
3.1 Data
Major part of the data set was obtained from Eurostat. This ensures that the definition of data se-
ries is compatible across countries and that fiscal data are recorded on accrual basis. As a particular
advantage, Eurostat provides debt data expressed in euros which ensures accounting consistency
between EMEA and non-EMEA countries and across various currency denominations. Some of the
CEE countries could not be included in the paper because of insufficient availability of accrualised
fiscal data. The choice of the variables for the linear VAR part reflects which variables enter the
government budget constraint. As yt, quarterly gross domestic product (B1GM) is used, tt is the
total general government revenue (TR), and bt is the general government consolidated gross debt
(GD). Primary government expenditure xt was obtained as total general government expenditure
(TE) minus interest payments (D41). GDP, government revenue, primary expenditure and debt
were seasonally adjusted and deflated by the GDP deflator. Inflation and money growth were ob-
tained as quarter-over-quarter growth rates of the seasonally adjusted GDP price deflator (CPI05)
and of the money aggregate M2, respectively. Data on money supply were obtained from the
central banks’ databases and publications. Interest rate rt is the EMU convergence criterion bond
yield (MCBY) from Eurostat. Where unavailable (from 1999 to 2001 or 2002), the yields were
approximated using long-term interest rates (IR3TIB) as obtained from the FRED database (Czech
republic, Hungary and Slovakia) or from the central bank (Slovenia). In the vector of endogenous
variables, rt is measured in percent per annum. In the debt equation, it is transformed to per-
cent per quarter. Government debt over 1999q1 to 1999q4 was interpolated from annual Eurostat
figures. The data set spans over the period 1999q1 to 2013q4.
Figure 2 displays the historical evolution of the data series. Money and deflator growth rates
were mostly positive and stable. Occasional larger swings were associated with the financial tur-
moil in 2001-02 and the Great Recession in 2008-09. The evolution of GDP, government revenue
and expenditure were linked rather closely as until 2008-09. Real GDP dropped sharply, given the
dependence of these small open economies on external demand, hurting the stream of government
revenue. From then on, government expenditure followed a diverging path, mostly exceeding the
revenue. As a result, the previously stable debt ratios plummeted, rising by 2013 close to the
60 percent threshold (Slovakia) or exceeding it by about 10 percent (Hungary, Slovenia). The
relation of interest rates and levels of debt seems inverted to what economic theory would dic-
tate. The highest debt levels have been associated with the historically lowest interest rates. The
declining trend in bond yields was distorted only by occasional crises, such as Slovenia 2001-02
(a turmoil spread from Latin America), Hungary and Lithuania 2008-09 (the Great Recession),
and Hungary 2011-12 (bond yields suffered under tensions in Europe and, subsequently, under
a country-specific crisis). Possible explanations for the steady decline in bond yields include the
ongoing integration efforts of the new EU members, and, more recently, monetary policy of the
ECB pushing the interest rates toward zero.
3.2 Relationships among the variables
As suggested by the comments above, historical data for the CEE countries involve some anomalies.
One of the problems is the steadily declining trend in the interest rate. Another problem is that
the crisis distorted the relationships among the variables. Clearly, the fiscal variables were not
responding to the government debt ratio for a period following the onset of the crisis.
Because of the anomalies, coming up with meaningful results in the FG framework is challeng-
ing. For the estimates of fiscal policy effects, the impulse responses need to reflect meaningful
relationship among the variables, e.g. the interest rate and government debt shall be positively
related to each other. To that end, some of the variables need to be transformed. The transforma-
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Figure 2: Historical data
tions, however, have cost for some of the model behaviours, such as out-of-sample debt forecast.
The paper therefore adopts two sorts of empirical specifications of the variables in the headline FG
model, both in levels and transformed (more details are explained in the next section).
The latter specification of variables results from an indepth correlation analysis with the aim to
find the best possible combination for impulse response functions across the six countries. Simple
detrending or inclusion of a time trend in the VAR regression would not do the job.
Table 2 summarises some of the results of the correlation analysis. It reports three sets of rank
correlation coefficients between variables included in the VAR and the debt ratio. The first set of
coefficients (upper panel) is computed for levels. The correlation is medium to strong positive
in case of the GDP and fiscal variables, and mostly negative in case of the interest rate. Simple
detrending (middle panel) implies a mostly positive correlation between the interest rate and the
debt ratio, and a negative correlation in case of the fiscal variables. (For a discussion on true
relationships among variables that contain a trend, cf. e.g. Chiarella and Gao, 2002.) The bottom
panel reports coefficients computed for transformed variables. The correlation is medium positive
in case of the interest rate and expenditure-to-GDP ratio, and negative or weak positive in case of
the revenue-to-GDP ratio.
3.3 General remarks to specification and estimation
The goals with the empirical specification are two-fold. The model should reach a good balance
between the fit in the linear VAR part and the fit of the nonlinear debt equation in levels. At the
same time, the impulse responses generated by the model shall reflect meaningful relationships
among the variables. In particular, the interest rate and government debt, the interest rate and
expenditure, or expenditure and debt shall be positively related to each other. Moreover, the
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Table 2: Correlation between the variables and debt ratio
Czech r. Hungary Lithuania Poland Slovenia Slovakia
(a) Levels
rt -0.61 -0.04 0.12 -0.51 -0.14 0.09
yt 0.56 0.34 -0.05 0.67 0.21 -0.18
τt 0.58 0.52 -0.08 0.62 0.32 -0.21
xt 0.60 0.35 -0.12 0.65 0.39 -0.27
(b) Detrended
rt -0.33 0.37 0.35 -0.12 0.47 -0.07
yt -0.61 -0.28 -0.65 -0.24 -0.85 -0.72
τt -0.34 -0.11 -0.55 -0.27 -0.72 -0.11
xt -0.14 -0.16 -0.42 -0.13 -0.50 -0.16
(c) Transformed
rt 0.33 0.12 0.25 -0.00 0.19 0.34
yt -0.01 -0.14 0.14 -0.13 -0.12 0.19
τt -0.11 -0.13 0.23 0.02 0.22 0.35
xt 0.09 0.33 0.22 0.33 0.32 0.29
Note: Reported are Kendall’s rank correlation coefficients: (a) no transformation of the variables and debt
ratio, (b) detrended variables and debt ratio, and (c) transformed variables and debt ratio.
modeling choice involves considerations w.r.t. stability. Stability of the linear VAR part does not
guarantee stability of the overall system of equations.
It appears that there are trade-offs among these goals. In particular, transformations of the
variables help achieve more meaningful impulse responses, but have cost for some of the model
behaviours, such as out-of-sample debt paths. To mention more considerations, inclusion of a
time trend would not help the impulse responses, but it would impact the overall stability. Log
transformations of variables appear to have cost for the model fit in levels.
Taking into account these trade-offs, the paper employs two empirical specifications of the
variables:q One specification is estimated over the pre-crisis sample (1999q1 to 2007q4) with variables
transformed as follows: output gap (GDP detrended using the Hodrick Prescott filter with a
standard lambda of 1600), ratio of government revenue to GDP, ratio of government primary
expenditure to GDP, and first-differenced debt ratio. As for Hungary and Poland, also the in-
terest rate is transformed, taking first differences. In the simulations, each of the variables is
transformed back to its original form in order to compute the level of debt.q A second specification is estimated over the full sample and works with variables and the debt
ratio in levels.
In both specifications, inflation and money growth are the same, that is quarter-over-quarter
growth rates of the GDP deflator and of the money aggregate, respectively.
Tables 7 to 10 in the Appendix report results of various statistical tests performed in EViews.
Prior to the VAR analysis, the data series were tested for unit roots using the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller and Phillips-Perron test (Table 7). The latter test is better suited for small samples and there-
fore more informative in our context. Fiscal variables and GDP were found to be I(1), growth rates
of the GDP deflator and money supply are I(0) or I(1). The vector of the six endogenous variables
in the headline model in levels is thus I(1). The Johansen test suggests that multiple cointegration
relations are present. However, examining further the cointegration relations is not the goal of
this paper, also because the inherent relationships among the variables are modelled through the
government budget constraint. The transformed variables are mostly I(0). Detrending or inclusion
of deterministic trends is avoided and the VAR estimation proceeds as is (cf. e.g. Lutkepohl, 2013).
A set of tests and information criteria were applied to determine the appropriate order of
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the VAR process. The tests suggest to include between 1 and 5 lags. This suggestion has been
confronted with the stability condition check, the Wald test on lag significance, as well as with trial
simulations under debt feedback. As a result, the appropriate number of lags in the endogenous
variables was determined as 1 in the specification with transformed variables, and 1 (Slovakia),
3 (Hungary and Slovenia) or 2 (remaining countries) in the specification with variables in levels.
Lags in the exogenous variable, government debt ratio or its first difference, were set to 1 in either
case.
The linear VAR model with debt as one of the endogenous variables ("debt in VAR") was esti-
mated in 2 (Czech republic, Poland and Slovakia) or 3 lags (Hungary, Lithuania and Slovenia).
In order to deal with the outliers, the following shift dummies were included in the regression:
2001q4 for Slovenia (impact of the financial turmoil in Latin America), 2003q1 for the Czech
republic (major revision of the national accounts), 2008q4-2009q4 for Lithuania (impact of the
Great Recession) and 2011q1 for Hungary (transfer of private pension fund assets to the state).
Estimated VAR residuals were submitted to normality, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity
tests in EViews. The multivariate test rejected normality of the residuals for the specification in
levels (Table 8). The specification with transformed variables passed the test relatively well for
most of the countries. The Portmanteau test found that the residuals are mostly autocorrelated.
The Lagrange multiplier test (Table 9) indicated that residuals are serially independent. The latter
test is better suited for small samples and therefore more relevant in our context. The White test
(Table 10) did not reject homoscedasticity of the residuals’ variance.
The remainder of the work was taken to Matlab. Estimation of the SVARX model follows the
standard LS estimator as in Lutkepohl (2005, chapter 3). Table 11 in the Appendix reports the
resulting fit of the headline FG model for the two specifications of the variables.
Having identified the reduced form, simulations then proceed as set forth in Section 2. Initial
conditions to each of the simulations are described in detail below. In impulse response functions
and historical decomposition, GDP, fiscal variables and debt are converted to percentages of the
no shock scenario GDP. All other variables are expressed in original units. Results presented in the
next section are computed under debt feedback, unless indicated otherwise.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Estimated coefficients at debt lags
Table 3 reports coefficients at debt ratio lags in the revenue and expenditure equation. The combi-
nation of the coefficients is stabilising w.r.t. government primary surplus. This has two-fold impli-
cations. First, debt paths generated by the model without taking account of the debt feedback will
turn explosive. Second, inclusion of the debt feedback will affect the impulse response coefficients.
Table 3: VAR coefficients at lagged debt ratio
tt xt tt xt tt xt
Czech r. Hungary Lithuania
bt− 0.6433 0.6338 bt− 2.9016 -0.7196 bt− -1.8544 -2.8345
1.046 1.365 0.745 1.384 0.973 1.221
Poland Slovenia Slovakia
bt− -0.0231 -0.8223 bt− 0.4421 0.0145 bt− 0.3840 0.0660
0.269 0.256 0.194 0.234 0.129 0.180
Note: Reported are estimated coefficients, beneath are standard errors as supplied by EViews.
Figure 3 displays debt ratio paths over the forecast horizon of ten years, generated under debt
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feedback and without. Initial conditions replicate the last few quarters of the sample period. The
exercise was performed e.g. in Cherif and Hasanov (2012) for the U.S., and Parkyn and Vehbi
(2014) for New Zealand. Similar to their results, the simulated out-of-sample debt path in the
CEE-6 is stabilised under debt feedback, but strongly explosive if debt feedback is omitted. Though
implausible in dimension, I think that the explosive debt path has something to say about fiscal
policy making. A future-oriented interpretation warns that without balancing carefully expenditure
and revenue, governments would run into unbearably high indebtedness. Looking backwards, it
were accumulated past deficits that brought the levels of debt to where they stand recently. In
that sense, the explosive debt path extrapolates imbalances the historical data already contain. In
analogy, the stabilised debt path extrapolates past episodes of consolidation or balanced budgeting.
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Figure 3: Historical and simulated debt ratios
The debt ratios presented in Figure 3 were simulated in the specification in levels. The specifi-
cation with transformed variables yielded virtually no difference between the simulation with and
without debt feedback and the generated debt ratio paths were implosive.
4.2 Effects of fiscal shocks
This section analyses effects of discretionary fiscal policy by means of impulse response functions
(IRF). Figures 4 and 5 show responses of the six variables to unexpected shocks in revenue and
expenditure for the model with transformed variables (shorthened sample 1999q1 to 2007q4).
Figure 6 displays responses to expenditure shocks for the model in levels (full sample 1999q1 to
2013q4). Either of the shocks was set up as a positive shock (increase) and was calibrated as one
percent of the initial GDP. Initial conditions in the GDP and debt ratio were set as the average
over the last in-sample year. Assumed is a zero primary surplus, i.e. both revenue and expenditure
equal the average of the two in the last in-sample year. Initial inflation and money growth are set
to zero. In addition, the model with transformed variables assumes that the initial GDP is at its
trend. Either of the figures presents three sorts of IRF: those in the headline model under debt
feedback (coupled with 90 percent confidence bands), the headline model without debt feedback,
and IRF generated by a linear VAR model.
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Figure 4: Responses to a revenue shock (headline model, transformed variables)
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Figure 5: Responses to an expenditure shock (headline model, transformed variables)
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Figure 6: Responses to an expenditure shock (headline model, variables in levels)
As a general remark, the responses to a revenue shock show somewhat more variation in size
and sign than those following an expenditure shock (cf. e.g. Petrovic et al. , 2014, and references
herein). The heterogeneity in the responses may be attributed to the rather broad scope of the
revenue variable. It also comprises transfers, which are differently correlated with the business
cycle and price developments than revenue from various types of taxes. A revenue shock (Figure
4) mostly yields a positive response in itself, inflation, and money supply growth. The response of
the interest rate, government expenditure and debt is mostly negative. The response of the GDP
is found negative in Slovakia and Slovenia. The somewhat counterintuitive positive response of
the GDP in the other countries might be associated with the broad specification of the revenue
variable, but eventually also with changes in the tax structure (cf. e.g. Haug et al. , 2013).
An expenditure shock (Figure 5) mostly yields a positive response in itself, inflation, interest
rate, GDP, government revenue, and debt. The response of money growth is mostly negative.
Compared to the model in levels (Figure 6), the specification with transformed variables improves
the IRF of the interest rate in the sense that it eliminates the negative sign. The literature men-
tions a possible explanation for an eventual decline in the interest rate, which may be due to a
strong, positive response of the GDP following the expenditure shock, coupled with a rise in gov-
ernment revenue (cf. e.g. Afonso and Souza, 2012, commenting on the results for the U.S.). Such
an explanation is plausible in the case of a supreme sovereign. However, in the context of the
CEE countries, a positive estimated response is more plausible, reflecting the fact that a higher
government deficit following an expenditure shock increases debt, making in turn its refinancing
more costly.
Table 4 below and Table 12 in the Appendix summarise cumulative responses of the GDP to
fiscal shocks up to three years ahead, estimated by the headline FG model in transformed variables
and in levels. The cumulative coefficients are expressed in percent of the no shock scenario GDP.
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The two specifications yield responses of a vastly different magnitude. In the transformed case
(Table 4, bottom part), a one GDP-percent shock in government expenditure yields a 0.00 to 0.01
percent added GDP within the first year. The cumulative 3-year coefficients range between 0.00
and 0.03. The estimated response is negative and insignificant for the Czech republic and Slovenia,
yielding a drop in the GDP of about -0.01 percent within the first year and -0.04 within three years.
The model in levels (Table 12) yields positive responses to an expenditure shock for all countries
except the Czech republic. It would yield 0.01 to 0.10 percent added GDP within the first year. The
cumulative 3-year coefficients range between 0.06 and 0.42. In the Czech republic, the estimated
1-year response is -0.18, cumulative 3-year response is -0.64. Turning to the revenue side (Table
4, upper part), a one GDP-percent shock to government revenue implies a sacrifice in the GDP of
about 0.01 percent in Slovakia and Slovenia. The estimated coefficients for other countries are
positively signed (the GDP would increase following a positive shock to revenue). By costrast, the
model in levels mostly implies negatively signed revenue multipliers (the GDP would decrease).
Table 4: Cumulative responses of output (headline model, transformed variables)
Czech r. Hungary Lithuania Poland Slovenia Slovakia
Revenue shock
With debt feedb.
1y 0.007 0.001 0.012 0.003 -0.005 -0.014
2y 0.017 0.002 0.034 0.007 -0.013 -0.050
3y 0.029 0.003 0.059 0.008 -0.021 -0.107
W/o debt feedb.
1y 0.007 0.000 0.015 0.003 -0.003 -0.014
2y 0.019 -0.000 0.039 0.007 -0.003 -0.049
3y 0.031 -0.001 0.065 0.008 0.003 -0.104
Ratio
1.12 0.27 1.18 1.01 0.52 1.00
1.09 -0.12 1.13 0.99 0.23 0.98
1.09 -0.32 1.09 1.01 -0.15 0.97
Expenditure shock
With debt feedb.
1y -0.010 0.009 0.010 -0.000 -0.009 0.003
2y -0.025 0.016 0.018 0.001 -0.023 0.005
3y -0.040 0.019 0.025 0.002 -0.036 0.005
W/o debt feedb.
1y -0.011 0.010 0.008 0.000 -0.010 0.004
2y -0.027 0.018 0.016 0.002 -0.030 0.009
3y -0.043 0.022 0.022 0.002 -0.052 0.015
Ratio
1.11 1.11 0.80 -1.70 1.12 1.26
1.08 1.13 0.87 1.43 1.29 1.83
1.09 1.12 0.91 1.30 1.46 3.19
Note: The responses are significant in the sense that the 90 percent confidence interval does not include a
zero impulse response (for Czech republic and Slovakia up to 1 year after a revenue shock, for Czech republic
and Slovenia up to 2 years after an expenditure shock). The bottom panels report ratios of the IRF generated
without debt feedback to those under debt feedback.
The estimated difference in the IRF generated under debt feedback and without is small and
mostly insignificant. It is somewhat more pronounced if the headline model is estimated in lev-
els of the variables. In the setup with transformed variables the IRF diverge over more distant
simulation horizon (starting with about 10 quarters). Reading the differences is further compli-
cated by the heterogeneity of the responses and by the fact that for each of the variables there
appear counterintuitive IRF in some of the countries, especially after revenue shocks. The coun-
terintuitive sign of the IRF turns the magnitude across the alternative debt feedback specifications
upside-down. Generally speaking, the debt feedback dampens the responses of output and debt,
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Table 5: Estimates of GDP response coefficients for emerging markets
Type of
shock
Authors Coverage 0 1y 2y 3y Notes
Revenue side
shock
Eller et al. (2011)
Czech r. 0.00 0.01 0.03
Hungary -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Poland -0.00 0.00 0.02
Slovenia 0.01 0.02 0.02
Slovakia -0.02 -0.05 -0.10
Franta (2012) Czech r. 0.00 0.20 0.30 Recursive indentification.
Klyviene and
Karmelavicius
(2012)
Lithuania -0.17 0.18 0.49 0.26 Response to effective tax rate
shock, Choleski identification.
Haug et al. (2013) Poland 0.09 0.14 0.15 0.12
Pecsyova (2013) Slovakia -0.00 -0.15 -0.17 -0.23
Batini et
al. (2014)
Emerging markets
and low income
countries
Short-term multipliers. Median
value: 0.20, range: 0.00 to 1.00.
Mucka and
Horvath (2015)
Slovakia -0.60 -1.70 -3.00 Implied multipliers. Average for
various types of taxes.
Kilponen (2015) Short-run fiscal multipliers.
Average for various types of
taxes.
Czech r. -0.30 -0.20
Slovenia -0.20 -0.20
Expenditure
side shock
Eller et al. (2011)
Czech r. -0.00 -0.01 -0.04
Hungary 0.01 0.02 0.01
Poland -0.00 -0.01 -0.02
Slovenia 0.01 0.00 -0.01
Slovakia -0.01 -0.01 0.00
Franta (2012) Czech r. 0.23 0.32 0.35 Recursive indentification.
Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko
(2012)
OECD countries 0.11
(0.96 /
-0.58)
Estimate for open economies,
country and time fixed effects.
Mean response. In brackets
recessions / expansions.
Haug et al. (2013) Poland 0.14 0.14 0.42 0.48
Ilzetzki, Mendoza,
and Vegh (2013)
High income and
developing
countries
Estimate for open economies.
Impact multiplier -0.077,
long-run multiplier -0.46.
Pecsyova (2013) Slovakia 0.14 0.39 0.65 0.39
Batini et
al. (2014)
Emerging markets
and low income
countries
Short-term multipliers. Median
value: 0.30, range: -0.40 to
2.35.
Petrovic et
al. (2014)
Emerging Europe 0.20 0.48 Impact and cumulative
multipliers.
Hory (2015) Emerging
markets.
Impact multiplier. PVAR: 0.40,
IP-VAR: 0.39.
Kilponen (2015) Short-run fiscal multipliers.
Czech r. 0.54 0.54
Slovenia 0.66 0.48
Mucka and
Horvath (2015)
Slovakia 0.90 0.86 1.04 Implied multipliers.
Note: Reported are estimates as provided by the authors in tables. In Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Vegh (2013), the
estimates for open economies are reported in Figure 7. For Batini et al. (2014), the median value is my own
calculation, based on Tables A.3.1 and A.3.2. For Kilponen (2015) and Mucka and Horvath (2015), the average
revenue multiplier is my own calculation, based on Tables 2 to 4 and 3.1, respectively. Most of the estimates are
impulse response coefficients based on VAR or theoretical models. If instead authors report multipliers or mean
estimates, this is explicitly mentioned under Notes. Abbreviations used: 0 - immediate response coefficient,
1y/2y/3y - cumulative 1 year (4 quarters) / 2 year (8 quarters) / 3 year coefficient (12 quarters).
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and eliminates permanent effects in the IRF over longer horizons, especially following expenditure
shocks. The bottom line to the change in the behaviour lies in the amplified adjustment in govern-
ment revenue (so-called fiscal reversal) and in the stronger reaction of the bond yield. Notice the
response of government revenue following an expenditure shock in Hungary, Lithuania, Poland
and Slovakia, response of the interest rate to expenditure shocks in Lithuania and Slovakia (Fig-
ure 5), and response of government debt following an expenditure shock in the Czech republic,
Hungary, Lithuania and Slovenia (Figure 6). For each percentage point of the GDP response to an
expenditure shock under debt feedback, the specification omitting the feedback yields about 1.1 to
1.3 percentage points within the first year (Table 4, the bottom panel). These findings generally
conform with the available applications of the FG framework in the sense that inclusion of the
debt feedback dampens the effects of expenditure shocks on output and eliminates from the IRF
persistent effects of the fiscal shocks on output and debt (cf. e.g. Favero and Giavazzi, 2007; and
Ilzetzki, 2011).
The difference between the headline model and the linear VAR is small and mostly not signifi-
cant for the IRF of the endogenous variables. However, the bias involved with the linear specifica-
tion makes a significant difference in the IRF of government debt (Figures 4, 5 and 6, first column
to the right).
Table 5 in this section and Table 13 in the Appendix provide evidence on fiscal policy effects
in emerging economies, including the CEE-6, known from the literature. More specifically, Table 5
collects response coefficients of GDP to fiscal shocks up to three years ahead. Table 13 compares
the signs of the response functions of GDP, inflation and interest rate. The definition of the fiscal
instruments is not identical across the papers, though net tax revenue and spending are used in
the majority of cases (cf. Table 1 in the introductory section). The use of government revenue and
expenditure in this paper is motivated by the inclusion of the government budget constraint.
Regarding the size of the GDP responses, the coefficients obtained in this paper conform to the
literature (Table 5). The estimates for emerging economies are typically small, below 0.5 within the
first year. One of the critical factors to the relatively lower effectiveness of fiscal policy, compared
to advanced economies, is the higher degree of openness (cf. e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko,
2012; Ilzetzki et al. , 2013; Petrovic, 2014; and Hory, 2015).
The evidence available in the literature is rather heterogenous in terms of response signs (Table
13 in the Appendix). Generally speaking, the literate sees expenditure shocks to yield expansionary
effects on output, inflation and the interest rate, whilst revenue shocks have contractionary effects
on output. In this paper, the IRF following an expenditure shock match the literature if variables in
the headline model are transformed. On the other hand, the estimated IRF after a revenue shock
are closer to the literature if variables are specified in levels.
To comment on specific countries, the GDP response to an expenditure shock for the Czech
republic is at odds with the majority of the papers. This result appeared robust to transformation
of the variables and the sample period. In a contrast to papers which worked with government
spending, the IRF in this paper may be affected by the rather broad scope of the expenditure
variable. Some of the social contribution and transfer categories might contribute to the resulting
crowding-out effect (cf. e.g. the positive multiplier after 2.5 year following a consolidation through
general transfers in Klyuev and Snudden, 2011; or, the negative effect of unemployment benefits
and other social benefits on GDP as from the 4th quarter in Ambrisko et al. , 2012). Similar as
herein, several papers found a positive GDP response after a revenue side shock in Poland. As for
Slovenia and Hungary, the significant difference in the IRF of the interest rate between the model
with and without debt feedback (Figure 5) might help reconcile the findings when the literature is
not unanimous about the sign of the GDP response.
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Figure 7: Responses to an expenditure shock conditional on government debt ratio
Table 6: Responses of output to an expenditure shock conditional on government debt ratio
Min. Max. Median for CEE-6
30 percent GDP
1y -0.0096 0.0098 0.0017
2y -0.0248 0.0180 0.0035
3y -0.0397 0.0246 0.0041
60 percent GDP
1y -0.0096 0.0097 0.0016
2y -0.0247 0.0179 0.0031
3y -0.0395 0.0244 0.0031
90 percent GDP
1y -0.0096 0.0096 0.0015
2y -0.0247 0.0177 0.0026
3y -0.0394 0.0242 0.0020
Note: Reported are cumulative IRF generated by the headline model in transformed variables. The initial debt
ratio is set as 30, 60 and 90 percent GDP.
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Figure 8: Decomposition of the GDP
4.3 Impact of government indebtedness on policy effectiveness
So far, the IRF were presented under the assumption that the initial debt ratio was at its level as in
the last in-sample year. This section now compares effectiveness of discretionary fiscal shocks for
various initial debt levels from low to high. Although the difference in the estimated IRF is small, it
is possible to draw some general remarks. Figure 7 illustrates for some of the countries that, ceteris
paribus, higher debt ratio will make public refinancing more costly, causing the debt rise to even
higher levels (steeper curve) before it starts to decline. Estimated response coefficients in Table 6
suggest that higher debt ratios may imply a sacrifice in the policy effectiveness on output over the
medium term. For an initial debt ratio of 90 percent, the median 3-year cumulative response of
the GDP following an expenditure shock drops to about a half compared to the simulation with a
30 percent debt ratio. The result agrees with Ilzetzki (2011) who found that higher debt would
have a negative impact on economic growth in Estonia.
4.4 Miscellaneous results
Figure 10 in the Appendix displays estimates of structural shocks in revenue and expenditure,
which were uncovered in the identification step of the VAR exercise. By construction, the structural
shocks in fiscal variables are cleaned for any systematic response to movements in GDP and other
macroeconomic variables. They may be used as proxies of the cyclically-adjusted fiscal variables
(cf. e.g. Parkyn and Vehbi, 2014). For instance, the CEE-6 recorded mostly negative shocks on the
revenue side and positive expenditure shocks in the period from 2008 to 2010.
Figure 8 herein and Figure 11 in the Appendix show a historical decomposition of output and
inflation, computed from initial conditions that replicate the historical pre-sample. (The decompo-
sition of other macroeconomic variables is available upon request.) The decomposition suggests
that the variables were driven mainly by macroeconomic shocks, and that structural shocks in gov-
ernment revenue and expenditure contributed to a lesser extent. The estimates are sensitive to
initial conditions, identification matrix and overall stability.
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Decomposition of the forecast error variance is available upon request. According to the esti-
mates, fiscal shocks explain a minor part of the variance in macroeconomic variables. The estimates
are sensitive to ordering of the variables in the VAR and to the identification matrix.
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Figure 9: Comparison of response functions under modified specification
Note: Shown are responses of the GDP to fiscal shocks.
4.5 Robustness check
The results have been submitted to three sorts of robustness check:
1. To assess sampling uncertainty, the impulse response coefficients are re-estimated using boot-
strap methods (one-step bootstrap from VAR residuals in 1000 draws). Presented is the median
response.
2. The assumption is challenged that government revenue is predetermined w.r.t. government ex-
penditure within the VAR. Impulse response functions are generated using an alternative or-
dering with the revenue and expenditure being swapped. Ordering of the other variables is
preserved.
3. The headline IRF are generated under the assumption that the bond yield is initially at its
level as in the last in-sample year (2013). The recent bond yields have been affected by the
ECB policy keeping the interest rate very low. As a third amendment, impulse responses are
simulated starting with the pre-crisis level of the bond yield (2007).
Calibration of shocks and initial conditions (in the third case, initial conditions in all other vari-
ables except for the interest rate) are identical as in the headline estimates presented above (Sec-
tion 4.2).
Figure 9 shows that the headline estimates are robust in sign to either of the checks considered.
The magnitude of the response functions differs slightly. The additional estimates mostly fall within
the 90 percent confidence interval of the headline estimate.
Notwithstanding previous comments, a few caveats should be mentioned. Any empirical results
that can be obtained for the CEE countries are based on a relatively short sample and will hold
so long the structural relationships of the economies remain unchanged. The estimated VAR coef-
ficients represent average past behaviour, which in part resulted from factors beyond the model,
such as integration process or economic convergence. The average estimates might disguise vul-
nerability of these economies that are largely dependent on external demand and bond market
sentiment. It would thus be appropriate in policy and forecasting to evaluate this empirical setting
to more in-depth theoretical models and consider a more complex set of country-specific shocks.
20
5 Conclusion
This paper estimates effects of fiscal policies under explicit debt feedback in six CEE economies.
The SVARX model in Section 2, feeding in dynamics from the government budget constraint, fol-
lows Favero and Giavazzi (2007). Analysing the impact of public debt on policy effectiveness is
still rather novel in the CEE-related literature.
Estimated coefficients of fiscal variables at lagged values of the debt ratio are stabilising w.r.t. the
primary surplus. This has two major implications. First, simulated out-of-sample debt paths are
stabilised under debt feedback, but strongly explosive if debt feedback is omitted. Second, both in-
clusion of the debt feedback and the way it is implemented matter to estimated impulse responses.
Section 4 computes a rich set of empirical results, most of which have not been presented
before for the CEE-6, such as response functions generated at various levels of the debt ratio and
historical decomposition of the time series under debt feedback. Unlike in linear VAR models, the
IRF depend on the size and sign of the shock and on the initial conditions. The paper therefore
compares the results under a range of assumptions. Some of the results are highlighted as follows:q Government expenditure shocks yield small, expansionary effect on output, which is a result
in line with the previous literature that finds low effectiveness of fiscal policy in small open
economies (e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012). The debt feedback would dampen the
responses of the GDP and debt, and eliminate permanent effects in the responses over longer
horizons. The bottom line to the qualitative change in the behaviour lies in the amplified adjust-
ment on the revenue side (fiscal reversal) and in the reaction of the bond yield.q Simulations starting from various levels of the debt ratio suggest that high government indebt-
edness might imply a sacrifice in the policy effectiveness on output over the medium term.q Historical decomposition of the time series shows that the macroeconomic variables were driven
mainly by macroeconomic shocks and to a minor extent by fiscal shocks.
Further extensions of this work may proceed alongside several venues. As a possible refine-
ment, the fiscal variables may be broken down in structure, to identify the effects of government
consumption, investment, public employment, net taxes and various transfers. To further increase
robustness of the findings, a set of alternative identification and estimation strategies might be
employed, such as e.g. in Franta (2012). The specification in this model relied on the account-
ing consistency of the government debt data which were expressed in terms of euros. With the
increasing foreign currency exposure of the public debt since the crisis, a break-down of debt to
shares denominated in domestic and foreign currency, as e.g. in Ilzetzki (2011), is another possible
extension. A further upgrade of the model might be tailored to address specific questions regarding
the countries of interest. It may incorporate country-specific factors beyond the general setting,
such as productivity growth, foreign direct investment, exposure to external demand shocks and
others.
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Appendix
Table 7: Individual Phillips-Perron unit root test
pit rt yt tt xt mt bt
Czech republic L L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L (c) L (c) L L (lin + c)
0.0000 0.0423 0.9675 0.4167 0.0869 0.0347 0.5099
Hungary L L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L L (lin + c) L L (lin + c)
0.0000 0.2388 0.9202 0.6712 0.2955 0.0008 0.8019
Lithuania L L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L L (lin + c)
0.0006 0.4683 0.803 0.8168 0.9683 0.0155 0.933
Poland L L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L L (lin + c)
0.0000 0.3525 0.5072 0.1821 0.2851 0.0000 0.5072
Slovenia L L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L L (lin + c)
0.0000 0.8842 0.9339 0.8553 0.9009 0.0001 1.0000
Slovakia L L L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L (lin + c) L L (lin + c)
0.0000 0.0000 0.6243 0.0883 0.4012 0.0002 0.9338
Note: The null hypothesis assumes that there is a unit root. Reported are one-sided p-values under the most
extensive specification (transformation of the series and test equation) when the null hypothesis could not be
rejected. Lag length is based on the Schwarz information criterion. The test uses a kernel sum-of-covariances
estimator with Bartlett weights and Newey-West bandwith selection. Abbreviations used: L - level, 1D - 1st
order difference, c - intercept, lin - linear trend.
Table 8: Multivariate tests of VAR residuals
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera
Transformed
Cs Dof Pv Cs Dof Pv Cs Dof Pv
Czech r. 19.9654 6 0.0028 42.8457 6 0.0000 62.8110 12 0.0000
Hungary 6.0276 6 0.4201 16.7722 6 0.0102 22.7997 12 0.0295
Lithuania 1.4162 6 0.9649 10.9137 6 0.0911 12.3299 12 0.4196
Poland 1.4843 6 0.9605 14.9082 6 0.0210 16.3926 12 0.1739
Slovenia 1.9512 6 0.9241 12.8812 6 0.0450 14.8325 12 0.2507
Slovakia 4.8923 6 0.5577 7.7095 6 0.2602 12.6018 12 0.3986
In levels
Cs Dof Pv Cs Dof Pv Cs Dof Pv
Czech r. 1.5596 6 0.9554 24.3808 6 0.0004 25.9403 12 0.0109
Hungary 1.5345 6 0.9572 46.3920 6 0.0000 47.9265 12 0.0000
Lithuania 32.9394 6 0.0000 44.5922 6 0.0000 77.5316 12 0.0000
Poland 3.9108 6 0.6887 20.6765 6 0.0021 24.5874 12 0.0169
Slovenia 11.1376 6 0.0842 44.7861 6 0.0000 55.9237 12 0.0000
Slovakia 80.7196 6 0.0000 432.4080 6 0.0000 513.1275 12 0.0000
Note: The null hypothesis assumes that the residuals are multivariate normal. Reported are the joint test
statistics, based on Choleski orthogonalisation of the residual variance-covariance matrix. Abbreviations used:
Cs - Chi-square test statistics, Dof - degrees of freedom, Pv- p-value.
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Table 9: Lagrange multiplier test on residual serial correlation
Czech r. Hungary Lithuania Poland Slovenia Slovakia
Transformed
Lag LM-st. prob. LM-st. prob. LM-st. prob. LM-st. prob. LM-st. prob. LM-st. prob.
1 51.6 0.04 38.4 0.36 79.1 0.00 55.9 0.02 44.2 0.16 23.8 0.94
2 48.1 0.09 31.1 0.70 44.8 0.15 41.5 0.24 39.5 0.32 34.3 0.55
3 52.6 0.04 28.6 0.80 31.0 0.71 21.9 0.97 44.2 0.16 38.0 0.38
4 46.9 0.11 43.0 0.20 29.7 0.76 25.4 0.91 59.5 0.01 30.1 0.74
5 41.1 0.26 36.4 0.45 31.6 0.68 50.0 0.06 32.2 0.65 32.6 0.63
6 51.1 0.05 36.1 0.47 37.3 0.41 38.6 0.35 50.7 0.05 38.6 0.35
7 32.9 0.62 36.0 0.47 28.1 0.82 31.0 0.70 45.9 0.13 24.7 0.92
8 35.6 0.49 39.4 0.32 29.5 0.77 24.6 0.93 39.3 0.32 22.5 0.96
9 36.1 0.46 28.0 0.83 38.3 0.36 40.6 0.28 30.6 0.72 40.3 0.29
10 37.7 0.39 31.2 0.70 28.9 0.79 33.7 0.58 33.1 0.61 27.0 0.86
In levels
Lag LM-st. prob. LM-st. prob. LM-st. prob. LM-st. prob. LM-st. prob. LM-st. prob.
1 36.4 0.45 28.6 0.81 66.9 0.00 59.4 0.01 39.2 0.33 48.2 0.08
2 39.5 0.32 39.6 0.31 59.8 0.01 62.8 0.00 35.1 0.51 26.9 0.86
3 28.4 0.81 41.3 0.25 20.8 0.98 29.1 0.79 44.8 0.15 29.9 0.75
4 46.6 0.11 45.4 0.14 33.5 0.59 38.8 0.35 56.9 0.01 33.9 0.57
5 51.7 0.04 38.1 0.38 24.1 0.94 30.9 0.71 46.1 0.12 49.7 0.06
6 40.7 0.27 34.8 0.53 31.6 0.68 41.6 0.24 38.0 0.38 27.3 0.85
7 34.5 0.54 47.8 0.09 21.3 0.97 31.4 0.69 42.3 0.22 26.5 0.88
8 33.4 0.59 35.7 0.48 36.5 0.44 46.2 0.12 48.5 0.08 34.9 0.52
9 43.8 0.17 52.6 0.04 20.5 0.98 25.8 0.90 28.6 0.80 41.0 0.26
10 46.6 0.11 36.3 0.46 45.6 0.13 32.1 0.66 25.2 0.91 29.6 0.77
Note: The null hypothesis assumes that there is no serial correlation at the specified lag. Reported are test
statistics from the Chi-square distribution with 36 degrees of freedom.
Table 10: White test on heteroscedasticity of residulas
LM-statistics degress of freedom p-value
Transformed
Czech r. 310.5793 294 0.2424
Hungary 264.9157 294 0.8876
Lithuania 328.3284 294 0.0821
Poland 290.6640 294 0.5440
Slovenia 309.5259 294 0.2557
Slovakia 299.6479 294 0.3979
In levels
Czech r. 565.8710 567 0.5055
Hungary 792.3231 819 0.7421
Lithuania 621.8290 567 0.0550
Poland 582.6468 546 0.1345
Slovenia 781.6303 819 0.8215
Slovakia 330.9787 294 0.0678
Note: The null hypothesis assumes that the residual variance is homoscedastic. Reported are joint test statistics
from Chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom as indicated, no cross-product terms are included.
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Table 11: Fit of the headline model
Czech r. Hungary Lithuania Poland Slovenia Slovakia
Transf. pre-crisis
pit 216.6 68.5 31.6 60.7 100.0 43.6
rt 6.8 4.2 7.0 5.8 69.8 26.9
yt 0.7 0.1 0.5 0.1 2.4 2.1
τt 1.3 0.5 1.0 0.3 1.2 2.6
xt 2.6 0.6 1.0 0.7 2.6 2.8
mt 24.2 9.5 8.9 99.9 642.3 15.4
bt 5.4 3.9 5.9 4.4 57.9 10.6
In levels
pit 47.9 50.4 393.0 112.4 46.6 43.4
rt 9.7 3.5 18.6 2.2 24.7 7.2
yt 1.3 0.8 3.9 0.5 2.8 0.2
τt 2.0 3.0 6.3 1.0 1.6 1.1
xt 1.7 0.7 7.8 1.3 2.9 0.3
mt 37.3 83.5 43.0 48.7 125.3 19.3
bt 7.8 6.0 11.3 4.3 25.1 11.1
Note: Reported are average absolute deviations from the observed historical values in percent.
Table 12: Cumulative responses of output (headline model, variables in levels)
Czech r. Hungary Lithuania Poland Slovenia Slovakia
Revenue shock
1y -0.008 -0.122 0.107 0.038 -0.046 -0.098
2y 0.013 -0.272 -0.238 0.063 -0.105 -0.271
3y 0.024 -0.427 -0.696 0.044 -0.037 -0.432
Expenditure shock
1y -0.182 0.092 0.005 0.041 0.083 0.021
2y -0.459 0.253 0.151 0.194 0.203 0.045
3y -0.637 0.424 0.387 0.411 0.240 0.059
Note: The responses are significant in the sense that the 90 percent confidence interval does not include a zero
impulse response (for Poland up to 1 year).
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Table 13: Estimates of response functions for the CEE-6
(a) (b)
Country Authors Model GDP infla-
tion
inter-
est
rate
GDP infla-
tion
inter-
est
rate
Czech r. Mirdala (2009) E + +- - + +- +-
Baxa (2010) E - +
Eller et al. (2011) E + -+ - - + +-
Franta (2012) E
structural - - - + + +
recursive + + + + + -
sign restrictions +0 + + + + -
Mirdala (2013) E - +
Dinu and Marinas (2014) E 0 + +
Stork and Zavacka (2010) T - - - +- - +
Klyuev and Snudden (2011) T - - - + + +
Ambrisko et al. (2012) T - + + + + +
Hungary Lendvai (2007) E - -
Mirdala (2009) E + +- -+ + + -+
Eller et al. (2011) E - - - + + +
Kotosz and Peak (2013) E -
Mirdala (2013) E - +
Dinu and Marinas (2014) E 0- + +
Algozhina (2012) T +-
Benk and Jakab (2012) T - +
Lithuania Karmelavicius and Klyviene (2012) E - -
Klyviene and Karmelavicius (2012) E -+
Mirdala (2013) E - +
Poland Mirdala (2009) E - -+ -+ 0+ + +
Eller et al. (2011) E -+ + -+ - + +
Haug et al. (2013) E + + + + - -
Mirdala (2013) E - +
Dinu and Marinas (2014) E 0+ + +
Slovenia Eller et al. (2011) E + + -+ +- + +-
Jemec et al. (2011) E -+ +-
Mirdala (2013) E - +
Dinu and Marinas (2014) E 0- + 0
Clancy et al. (2014) T + +- +
Slovakia Mirdala (2009) E + + + + + +
Eller et al. (2011) E - + - - +- +
Mirdala (2013) E - +
Pecsyova (2013) E - - + +- - +
Dinu and Marinas (2014) E 0- -+ +
Klucik (2015) T -+ +- + +
Mucka and Horvath (2015) T - +
Note: Reported are signs of the response functions to a positive fiscal shock in the revenue side (a) and ex-
penditure side variable (b). Symbols used: E stands for empirical (VAR) model, T denotes theoretical model,
+ positive response, - negative response, 0 response close to zero; combinations of the symbols denote sign
reversion.
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Figure 10: Estimated structural shocks
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Figure 11: Decomposition of the GDP deflator growth rate
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